The cost of locating and killing Osama Bin Laden


In the space of forty minutes on May 1, 2011, two Navy SEAL teams descended on a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and killed Osama bin Laden in a short operation. They brought the man to justice, who was responsible for the killing of 5,000 Americans on September 11, 2001, and thousands of others in countries from Spain to Iraq. President Obama’s greatest victory to date in the war on terror vindicated the intelligence architecture—put into place by his predecessor—that marked the path to bin Laden’s door. According to the present and former administration officials, CIA interrogators gathered the initial information that ultimately led to bin Laden’s death.

The US located Al Qaeda’s leader by learning the identity of a trusted courier from the tough interrogations of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the 9/11 attacks, and his successor, Abu Faraj al-Libi. Armed with the courier’s nom de guerre, American intelligence agencies later found him thanks to his phone call to a contact already under electronic surveillance. Last August, the courier traveled to bin Laden’s compound, but it took another eight months before the CIA became certain that the al-Qaeda leader was hiding inside. The successful operation to kill bin Laden followed in the steps of earlier victories in the war on terror made possible by the enhanced interrogation program. Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, thought at the time to be al-Qaeda’s operations planner, in the spring of 2002 led to the capture of much of al-Qaeda’s top leadership at the time.

On September 11, 2002, Pakistan won Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the man on the right, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) and the main conduit between al Qaeda and Mohammed Atta Chief Commander 11.09. Six months later, landed American and Pakistani agents KSM, the “principal architect” of 9 / 11 attacks and a terrorist entrepreneur.

Not only are the images of the three commanders to take substantial parts of the Al Qaeda of the action, they also provided information that prevent future terrorist attacks. The report 9 / 11 Commission is a testament to the vast amount of information they provided.

Both Porter Goss, then director of the CIA, and Pat Roberts, then President of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said publicly that they provided actionable intelligence. Michael Hayden, CIA director at the end of the Bush administration, reports that most of the United States came about al-Qaida in the early years of the War of the interrogation of the leader of Al Qaeda. When civil rights activists had their way, not however, this information would come into the hands of the United States. They argue that any attempt to coerce a detainee torture is -torture narrative mix any method of interrogation that goes beyond the standard font of the house -interview with a war crime also human rights activists and some in the media a broader Bush administration would have gone to Al Qaeda the Geneva Convention protection as part of a deliberate conspiracy to torture Al-Qaeda stolen. These interrogation techniques “migrated” to Iraq, where they produced terrible abuses at Abu Ghraib.

This conspiracy theory is nothing more than an exercise in hyperbole and partisan smear. The Bush administration went through its internal struggles of the Geneva edition, three months after the attacks of 9 / 11. U.S. forces were still in Afghanistan and President Bush did not start his political offensive against Iraq until the fall of 2002. Iraq has presented an entirely different situation, a war between nation-states, which was clearly covered by the Geneva Conventions.

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